【誰にともなしに、独り言レス―その2963】
既に Apollo 11 post-flight press conference 16 September 1969（The First Lunar Landing: 20th Anniversary. As Told by the Astronauts. NASA EP-73）でオルドリンは状況を（ほぼ正確に）把握していた（プログラム・アラームはランデブー・レーダーを意図的にアクティブにしていたせいだと薄々勘づいていた）ようにも取れる発言をしていて―
Aldrin： Well, I think we pretty well understand what caused these alarms. It was the fact that the computer was in the process of solving the landing problem and at the same time we had the rendezvous radar in a powered-up condition and this tended to add an additional burden to the computer operation. Now I don't think either the ground people or ourselves really anticipated that this would happen. It was not a serious program alarm. It just told us that for a brief instant the computer was reaching a point of being overprogrammed or having too many jobs for it to do. Now a computer continually goes through a wait list of one item after another. This list was beginning to fill up and the program alarm came up. Unfortunately it came up when we did not want to be trying to solve these particular problems, but we wanted to be able to look out the window to identify the features as they came up so that we would be able to pinpoint just where, in the landing ellipse stage, the computer was taking us.
と、アラームは大した問題じゃないけど（着陸地点を見つけようとしてるのに）タイミングが悪かったといった程度で（ランデブー・レーダーのせいであっても、自分は悪くない的に感じさせなくもないニュアンスで熱弁して）片付けている。
それに続いて（すかさず）アームストロングは、まことにアームストロングらしく（トーマス・ペイン長官に if anything looked wrong we were to abort the mission. と言われてるし―その2956参照）普通なら即、中止かもしれないのに、（即）着陸続行の go サインを出してくれた管制の英断を称賛してますね、あのヘラヘラのイルカ顔で…（←YouTube で視聴可）
Armstrong：Suppose we were carrying on a rapid fire conversation with the computer at that point, but we really have to give the credit to the control center in this case. They were the people who really came through and helped us and said "continue", which is what we wanted to hear.
